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Election Assistance Commission (EAC)


EAC Requests Comments on Manual for Voting System Testing & Certification Program PDF Print Email
Election Assistance Commission (EAC)
By Election Assistance Commission   
October 02, 2006

Download the Draft Voting System Testing and Certification Program Manual

 

The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) is requesting public comments on a draft procedural manual for the voting system testing and certification program. The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) directs the EAC to assume responsibility for the certification, de-certification and re-certification of voting system hardware and software used in conducting federal elections and for the accreditation of testing laboratories. This mandate represents the first time the federal government will provide for the voluntary testing and certification of voting systems, nationwide.

In response to the new HAVA requirement, the EAC is developing a program that requires the submission and retention of information related to voting systems and voting system manufacturers.  EAC has released for public comment a draft procedural manual that will be used to obtain the necessary information once the program is in place. This is a voluntary effort by the EAC to gather input from the public on the EAC's administrative procedures for certifying or decertifying voting systems. Please review the manual and submit written or electronic comments according to the instructions contained on the website link below. For further information contact Brian Hancock, Director of Voting System Certification, 1225 New York Avenue, Suite 1100, Washington, D.C., (202) 566-3100, Fax: (202) 566-1392.

Please click on this link to view and comment on the proposed manual.

DEADLINES: Written or electronic comments on this draft procedural manual must be received on or before 5:00 p.m. EDT on October 31, 2006.

EAC Requests Public Comment On Draft of 2006 Election Survey PDF Print Email
Election Assistance Commission (EAC)
By Warren Stewart, VoteTrustUSA   
August 02, 2006

The Election Assistance Commission (EAC) is accepting comments on information gathering activity for the DRAFT 2006 Election Administration and Voting Survey.  Written comments must be submitted on or before Friday, September 29, 2006. The proposed survey can be downloaded in PDF format here. Specifically the EAC is requesting comments on the neccesity and utility of the information being requested in the survey and ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected.

 

The EAC conducts the survey as part of its role as a national clearinghouse and resource of information regarding election administration as established by the Help America Vote Act (HAVA). Described as "the largest and most comprehensive survey of voting and election administration practices ever conducted by a U.S. government organization," The 2004 Election Day Survey was distributed to election administrators in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and information was received from 6,568 election administration jurisdictions. Subjects covered included voter registraiton, ballots counted, turnout, absentees, provisional ballots, overvotes and undervotes, voting equipment usage, and polling place operations. The results of the 2004 Survey are available for download here.

 

The survey results, which were released in September, 2005, have been used to draw conclusions about a wide variety of election administration issues, ranging from provisional and absentee ballot procedures to voting technology. Election Data Services (EDS) was contracted to collect, review, and analyze the findings of the 2004 Survey. In an article published shortly after the release of the survey results, Michael McDonald and Kimball Brace of EDS cautioned "While the Election Day Survey holds promise to inform us about voters' election experiences and the administration of elections, the survey also reveals continuing challenges."

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NIST Spokesman Acknowledges Unacceptability of Voting System Reliability Standards PDF Print Email
Election Assistance Commission (EAC)
By Warren Stewart, VoteTrustUSA   
July 23, 2006
In the Joint Congressional Hearing of the Science and House Administration Committees on July 19, the question of the acceptable failure rate for voting systems was addressed to the panel of witnesses by Rep. Brian Baird (D-WA). Baird noted that “…under the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines there’s an acceptance of a 9.2% failure rate of all voting systems used in any 15 hour period. I’m curious if that is actually the standard that we’ve set – a 9.2% failure rate - and if that’s that’s an acceptable standard, I’m very puzzled by that. That is, by the way, far less than an incandescent lightbulb.”

The absurdly lax reliability standard found in the current Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG), established by the Federal Election Commission in 2002 was carried over into the new standards adopted by the Election Assistance Commission last December, had previously been dismissed in public comment. This time it was acknoweledged immediately by NIST spokesman Mark Skall (pictured at right) of the Software Diagnostics and Conference Testing Division of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, who answered “Yeah, that comes from the existing standards and we’re researching right now to actually update that and to make a much more acceptable failure rate.”

Objecions to the acceptable failure rate was brought to the EAC’s attention repreatedly during the public comment period and in public hearings of the Technical Guidelines Development Committee before the new VVSG were adopted and are detailed in Howard Stanislevic’s report “DRE Reliability – Failure By Design”. An Open Letter from VoteTrustUSA to the EAC questioning the reliability standard and requesting action to improve it has been ignored so far. It is encouraging that the inadequacy of this standard has now been acknowledged and that a more acceptable failure rate apparently will be demanded of the machinery that counts our votes.

Will this take the form of an amendment to the new standards which don’t tke effect until December, 2007? Or will it be part of the next iteration of the standards projected for adoption next summer and not effective until 2009? Are American voters stuck with a situation in which 1 out of 11 machines are allowed to fail in the 2006 and maybe even 2008 elections?

As Rep. Baird pointed out to his colleagues on the committees “Given that many of us have lived or died on less than a percentage point margin in elections, including yours truly – I'd like to see a higher rate of reliability.” Rep. Baird lost in his first attempt at election to Washington’s 3rd District in 1996, Rep. Baird lost to incumbent Linda Smith by 887 votes, less than .4% of the votes cast.
Are the Voting System Standards Helping to Solve the Problems With Our Elections? PDF Print Email
Election Assistance Commission (EAC)
By Howard Stanislevic, VoteTrustUSA   
July 20, 2006

This written testimony was submitted by VoteTrustUSA for the Joint Committee of the House Administration and Science Committee on July 19, 2006.

 

Before this question can be answered, we must first ask if there actually are standards in any real sense of the word. Former Election Assistance Commission (EAC) Chair DeForest Soaries has opined that there are not, and we believe there is considerable support for his argument.1 While voting system standards do have the potential to solve election problems, it’s clear that to date they have not. Legislation has a much better chance of achieving this goal.

In Sections 221 and 222 of the Help America Vote Act (42 USC 15361 and 15362 respectively), Congress gave the EAC the authority to develop, adopt, publish and modify the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG). HAVA also created the EAC’s Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC) and officially adopted as its first set of guidelines, the most recent standards developed by the Federal Election Commission prior to the date of HAVA’s enactment. Voting systems in use today are purported to comply with these 2002 standards, but unfortunately “compliance” is a relative term.

While the term “voluntary” as used in the guidelines refers to their adoption by the States, those States that choose to adopt the VVSG constitute a large market for the vendors’ products. Market forces being what they are, buyers must set standards for sellers and sellers must meet those standards; otherwise the buyers can take their business elsewhere. The standards are therefore voluntary for the states but effectively mandatory for any vendors who wish to compete in over 39 States that require federal certification. But the VVSG contains a giant loophole that allows any of the standards therein to be waived by the EAC itself or by its predecessor, the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED).2 This has resulted in the certification of non-compliant voting systems.

Some of the standards with which vendors may not have to comply include those that allow the states to verify the authenticity of the software running on their voting machines; those that determine how easy the machines are to use; accessibility requirements for disabled voters; security requirements to prevent unauthorized access to voting systems or the corruption of election data; and even the already lax hardware reliability requirement of only a 163-hour mean time between failures.

The loophole language, which was expanded to include all of the guidelines in the 2005 version, means that at the sole discretion of the EAC, any or all of the standards can be waived to allow approval of non-compliant voting systems. So not only is adoption of the VVSG by the States voluntary, but so is compliance with the VVSG by the vendors. Not even the authors of the guidelines -- the Election Assistance Commission -- are bound to comply with them. The only “standards” that cannot be waived by the EAC are those in the HAVA statute, which can be found in Section 301 (42 USC 15481).

What is even more disturbing is that neither HAVA nor the VVSG contain any requirement for the ability to independently verify the election results generated by voting systems. This allows vendors to offer systems lacking this capability, and they have been doing so eagerly for years, thereby removing any notion of checks and balances from the electoral process.

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Human or Machine Error: What's The Truth? PDF Print Email
Election Assistance Commission (EAC)
By John Gideon, VotersUnite.org and VoteTrustUSA   
July 18, 2006
Some elections officials constantly invoke "voter trust and confidence" as the most important part of their jobs. In that invocation they cite disinformation about there being no incidents of voting machine problems as they blame all problems on the human factor. It's a strange defense of voting machines because it is completely false and there are stacks of evidence of failures to prove that it is a false defense. That is unless they go back to humans designing and building the systems; the failures are certainly all human if you go back that far.

On June 15, the Elections Assistance Commission held their monthly meeting, in Washington DC, with the intent of getting a report on a project they are funding that will provide a set of guidelines for election management and that will be available for use by every county in the country. Even in the atmosphere of a meeting that probably had few people in the audience and that was conducted with the typical sugary sweet politeness of a publicly held federal committee meeting the commissioners, and at least one of their 'insider' speakers, practiced delivering their misinformation. Perhaps they are trying to convince themselves that they must 'trust and have confidence' by repeating the false premise that voting machines do not fail, humans fail?

Tom Wilkey is the Executive Director of the EAC. In the meeting he had this to say about the status of voting machines in the 2006 primaries, "There have been some issues, but none appear to be systematic[sic] issues related to the operation of the voting equipment."

In his testimony Dr. Brit Williams, who was one of the two people to report on the election management manual, made this stunningly ill-informed statement, "It is difficult to find a single incident where an election anomaly was a direct result of the voting system." He then followed that statement with another, "……election anomalies are rarely caused by the voting system. They are caused by human mistakes, not by people intent upon malicious mischief or fraud, but by honest, well-meaning people making perfectly normal human mistakes."

It is apparent that the EAC is all about promoting "trust and confidence" by misrepresenting the facts instead of fixing the problems. Instead of forcing the vendors to produce a good product and good service the EAC, instead, keeps quiet about known and publicized problems with voting machines as they tell everyone to have confidence in the voting system.
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