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The Dirty Little Secrets of Voting System Testing Labs
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By Avi Rubin, Johns Hopkins University
December 16, 2005
This article appeared in The Huffington Post. It is reposted with permission of the author.
A couple of weeks ago, I spoke at a voting system testing summit hosted
by the Secretary of State of California, Bruce McPherson. It was an
event that included members of the US Election Assistance Commission,
Secretaries of State, local election officials, vendors, voting machine
testers, representatives from NIST, social scientists who study voting
issues, and computer scientists, such as myself.
Most notable by their absence were Wyle Laboratories and Ciber Inc. Let me explain.
Before election officials can purchase voting systems, those systems
need to be certified by a federally accredited lab called an
Independent Testing Authority (ITA). There are three such labs in the
US: Ciber, Wyle Labs, and Systest. These labs are tasked with testing
any proposed voting systems against federal standards, in this case,
the 2002 federal standards, soon to be replaced by the 2005 voluntary
voting system guidelines (VVSG). You would think that these labs would
be very interested in attending a summit such as this, and in fact,
they were all invited. Only Systest showed up.
There were several overriding themes that emerged at the voting systems
testing summit. Perhaps the most prevalent one was that the ITAs
consistently decline to appear at these meetings. Why? Well the main
reason is that they are fraught with conflict of interest and
incompetence. In fact, had they shown up, they would have been raked
over the coals by some of the voting system examiners that attended the
summit. For instance, an examiner from Pennsylvania wanted to know how
come so many systems that passed the ITA testing still had serious
security and even operational flaws. The Systest representative, who
had the misfortune of representing his entire industry alone, replied
that they were only required to test against the standard. When pressed
about whether or not the ITAs would fail a system if a serious flaw was
found, the reply was that a memo would be written, but that the system
would still pass. I couldn't believe it. The company that was tasked
with certifying machines for elections in the United States would still
pass them, even if a serious flaw was found, as long as the machine did
not violate any aspects of the standard. Unbelievable.
Now, let me talk a bit about the conflict of interest. As a friend of
mine put it, the ITAs are not independent and they have no authority.
So Independent Testing Authority is a misnomer. Thankfully, NIST is
going to change the name next year. Here's where it gets bad. The ITAs
are hired by and paid by -- the vendors. That is, when a vendor has a
voting machine that they want certified, they find an ITA who is
willing to certify the voting machine. Any memos about flaws that are
discovered remain confidential. There is no requirement to disclose any
problems that are found with the machines. In fact, the entire ITA
report is considered proprietary information of the voting machine
vendor. After all, they paid for it. This provides an incentive for
ITAs to certify machines, to satisfy their clients.
Two years ago, my research team got our hands on the code that runs
inside of Diebold's Accuvote machines. We performed a source code
analysis and reported all kinds of serious security problems (see
http://avirubin.com/vote/analysis/). It was incredible to me that such
machines were actually deployed and used in elections. Equally
confounding was that a national testing lab, in this case Wyle Labs,
actually certified this machine. Either they did not know the first
thing about cryptography and security, or they did not look at the
source code. In fact, according to the 2002 standards, they were not
required to examine the code.
So, the current state of affairs is grim. The ITA model provides an
incentive to certify bad systems, and clearly such systems are being
certified all the time. When the ITAs find a serious problem, it is
relayed, confidentially to the vendor, and the only thing that the
public ever learns is that a machine was certified. If a machine is not
certified, nobody ever learns about it. The ITAs are aware enough of
how broken the system is that they mostly hide from public events where
they might be taken to task. Here's how I would reform the system.
First off, I would have all the vendors pay a tax to NIST. NIST would
then hire real independent testers to examine any voting machine
proposed by a vendor. The testers would be paid more for finding
problems with the machines than for certifying them. Thus, you can be
sure that the testers tried every way of failing a machine before
passing it. Everything done by the testers, every test performed, as
well as the result, would be public. Occasionally, to keep the testers
on their toes, NIST would throw a machine at the testers with a known
serious problem, just to see if the testers could find it, and testers
who did not find the problem would be penalized. The whole process
would be open and transparent to the public. I doubt systems such as
the 2003 Diebold Accuvote would have ever made it to a polling station
in that model.
I learned a lot at the voting system testing summit, and I applaud
Secretary McPherson for the dialogue that he opened up. I sincerely
hope that in such events in the future, there will be no stakeholders
who are afraid or ashamed to show their faces.
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