Election Integrity News - October 24, 2006
This
Week's Quote: "“The GAO report indicates that we need to
get serious and act quickly to improve the security of electronic voting
machines. The report makes clear that there is a lack of transparency
and accountability in electronic voting systems – from the day that
contracts are signed with manufacturers to the counting of electronic
votes on Election Day. State and local officials are spending a great
deal of money on machines without concrete proof that they are secure
and reliable. American voters deserve better.” U.S. Representative.Henry
Waxman on the release of the Government Accountability Office's report
on electronic voting machines on October 21, 2005..
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In this issue ...
National Stories
Former EAC Commissioners Interviewed on CNN
Independent Review Reveals Flaws In Voting System Testing Process
Polling Sites Often Neglect Disability, Language Minority Access Requirements
Losing Elections' Paper Trail: Crisis Waiting To Happen
Blocking the 2006 Vote
electionline Report Finds Potential for Trouble at Polls
News From Around the States
The United States Supreme Court at the Polls, in Arizona:
The More Things Change·
Voting Irregularities Discovered in Washington, D.C.
Primary Election Results
Chicago Voter Registration Database Flawed
Maryland: Dealing With Failure
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The EAC's Proposed Testing and Certification
Program – Still A Chance For Bold Action?
Warren Stewart, VoteTrustUSA
 The
broader community of public interest organizations concerned about
the accuracy and integrity of the election process welcomed the
announcement in July 2006, that the Election Assistance Commission
(EAC) would be proposing a new national system for testing and certifying
voting systems for use in Federal elections. The proposed
program released for public comment earlier this month reflects
some significant improvements over the existing process. However,
the overall philosophy expressed in the proposed testing and certification
program remains too deferential to the interests of voting equipment
manufacturers while inadequately reflecting the interests of the
primary stakeholders in the election process – the voters.
On the fundamental issues of transparency and public oversight,
it is substantially a perpetuation of the current system with new
acronyms.
The current regime, under which voting machine manufacturers contract
with ‘independent’ testing laboratories that produce
secret test reports that inevitably lead to ‘qualification’
by the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED),
has met with mixed reviews at best. Speaking
before Congress in 2004, Carnegie Mellon computer science professor
Michael I. Shamos said, "the system we have for testing and
certifying voting equipment in this country is not only broken,
it is virtually nonexistent." He recommended that "It
must be re-created from scratch or we will never restore public
confidence in elections."
Among Dr. Shamos’ first recommendations was that the manufacturers
should not pay the laboratories that test their equipment, because
under this arrangement the manufacturers effectively become the
laboratories’ clients and subject to conflicts of interest
that raise questions about their ability to effectively safeguard
the public interest.
Sadly, the EAC may be missing an opportunity to do just that.
The credibility of the current process has been further damaged
by the severe reliability,
security, and accuracy problems revealed in a steady stream
of academic and governmental studies and in hundreds of cases of
malfunctions in fielded machinery. While we will never know
what defects have been uncovered by the current ITA, we know that
the ITA did not uncover the vulnerability caused by the presence
of interpreted code on Diebold AccuVote OS memory cards revealed
in Leon County, Florida, the
“upgrade” feature of AccuVote TSx revealed in Emery
County, Utah and the viral propagation properties of this feature
exploited in the
recent Princeton study; the report
by Paul Craft that the firmware version on ES&S optical
scanners is not verifiable, nor the revelation
in an audit in Pinellas County, Florida that an SQL compiler
is routinely installed on the Sequoia WinEDS system.
The failure of current narrow functional testing delegated to
the ‘official’ testing laboratories indicates that the
EAC needs to expand the examination and testing of voting machinery
and sponsor examination and testing by academics and other interested
parties. Rather than merely the testing required for certification,
additional voting system testing could serve to improve and refine
the subsequent versions of the voting system standards.
The current crisis of confidence in the electoral process demands
bold actions from the EAC - bold actions that Congress mandated
the EAC to take. Without any legislative changes to current statutes,
the Election Assistance Commission can take significant steps toward
restoring confidence in the election process by requiring manufacturers
to make their systems transparent; by requiring testing laboratories
to make their methods, work and results transparent; and by opening
the testing effort to truly independent. The EAC should seize this
opportunity promote transparency and public oversight of the way
votes are cast and counted in the United States. Permalink
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National Stories
Two former Election Assistance Commisioners joined Lou Dobbs on October
23, 2006. The transcript of their conversation follows.
Joining me now, two former members of the Election Assistance Commission,
an agency set up in response to the Florida debacle in the 2000 election, part
of the Help America Vote Act.
First meet Deforest Soaries (pictured at left), he's a Republican, former chair
of the Election Assistance Commission.
Good to have you here.
Ray Martinez (pictured at right), Democrat, former vice chair of the commission.
Ray, good to have you with us, all the way from Austin, Texas. Thank you.
Let's begin with a third of -- and if we can show these stats. It's sort of
interesting, one third of voters this November will be using new voting equipment.
Thirty-eight percent will be using electronic voting equipment.
Deforest, what do you think is going to happen?
DEFOREST SOARIES, FORMER ELECTION COMMISSIONER: Well, I think we're going to
have frustration at the polls. Many poll workers will be inadequately prepared
for the use of this equipment. And if there's a close race, there will be tremendous
frustration because there will be difficulty confirming what the real results
were, given the lack of any paper to verify what happened at the polls.
DOBBS: And Ray, looking at another statistic that everybody might as well start getting comfortable with, the 2000 voting machines, they malfunctioned in 25 states. I mean, are we going to see that -- something that widespread, do you think, in this election, or will it be even worse?
RAY MARTINEZ, FORMER ELECTION COMMISSIONER: Well, I certainly hope it's not
anything to that magnitude, Lou. And I think the American public ought to demand
that election officials around the country do their due diligence to ensure
that we don't see problems like that. You know, election administration is comprised
of three essential parts, Lou, the technology we use, the processes that we
have in place and the people that run our elections. And we've seen a lot of
problems when it comes to the technology, but we've also seen equal amounts
of problems when it comes to the people aspect of election administration. We
have to emphasize that as well. Read
the Entire Transcript
Key voting system standards missing from test plans
Download
NYSTEC Review of CIBER's Voting System Test Plans
As
the EAC's Oct. 26 hearing on its new Voting System Testing and Certification
Program approaches, new findings from New York reveal that the certification
program in place today is far from adequate, requiring the States to pick up
the slack.
NYSTEC, a not for profit spin-off from the US Air Force's Research Laboratory
at Rome, NY, was hired by the State Board of Elections to conduct an independent
review of the voting system test plans issued by one of the three so-called
Independent Testing Authorities that test voting systems on behalf their manufacturers,
CIBER, Inc., previously hired by the state.
NYSTEC's report is highly critical of CIBER, stating that the ITA's test plan
for the state's new voting systems lacked numerous security and functional testing
requirements of the 2006 NY State Election Law, the EAC's 2005 Voluntary Voting
System Guidelines Vols. 1 & 2, and NY State's Voting System Standards. Read
the Entire Article
Millions Of Voting Age Americans Covered By 'Ballot Access' Laws Ill-Served
By Election Administration
Download
the Ballot Access Briefing Paper
Millions of disabled and language-minority American citizens face impediments
to voting because many states do not meet federal ballot and polling place access
requirements, according to a new briefing paper by Demos, a national, non-partisan
public policy and research center.
The Ballot Access briefing paper, which is published this week as part of Demos'
Challenges to Fair Elections briefing paper series, shows that states across
the U.S. are failing to live up to the promise of landmark "ballot access"
legislation, such as section 203 of the Voting Rights Act and provisions of
the Help America Vote Act, which require polling sites to accommodate U.S. citizens
with disabilities and those who may have limited proficiency in English.
"Vast numbers of eligible voters depend on enforcement of these laws to
protect their right to vote," said Brenda Wright, managing attorney of
the National Voting Rights Institute, a partner of Demos. "Yet even as
we approach the third major election of the 21st century, it is clear that we
still have a long way to go in assuring that all citizens have fair ballot access."
Read
the Entire Article
The electronic issue has been largely ignored. If either party wins
in a blowout, that may continue. But if the vote is close...
This op/ed appeared in the Philadelphia
Inquirer. It is reposted with permission of the author.
If you're worried that the newfangled electronic voting machines are a threat
to the integrity of our democracy, rest assured: You're not just being paranoid.
This is a worrisome topic to introduce on the eve of crucial midterm elections,
but since the Republican Congress didn't bring it up over the summer - preferring,
instead, to spend precious weeks showcasing dead-end hot-button issues, such
as gay marriage and flag burning - we'll do so here. After all, we're only talking
about whether 21st-century Americans can trust the high-tech process by which
they choose their leaders.
This isn't a particularly sexy issue. It only rarely seeps into the popular
culture (comic Bill Maher has quipped that "some 13-year-old hacker in
Finland is going to hand the presidency to Kylie Minogue"), and at first
one might be tempted to outfit the handwringers with tinfoil hats and send them
on an all-expenses-paid trip to visit Oliver Stone.
But that impulse is quickly overridden by the weight of the empirical evidence,
which shows that the newest touch-screen machines - which will serve roughly
40 percent of the 2006 electorate - are about as reliable as Hal, the computer
that wrought havoc in Stanley Kubrick's 2001: A Space Odyssey.
For starters, these machines can be hacked all too easily, but that's only
the most dramatic finding. More often - and this has already happened in a number
of states, including Maryland and New Mexico - they lose votes, fail to register
votes, "switch" votes between competing candidates, count votes twice,
and simply freeze before voters can vote. Read
the Entire Article
This article appeared on TomPaine.com.
It is reposted here with permission of the author.
While
much attention is appropriately being paid to the problems with electronic voting
machines, we must also focus on the many other ways voters were disenfranchised
in 2004 and could be again in 2006. In the midst of talk about paper trails
and frozen computer screens, have we all forgotten the registration problems,
the intimidation tactics, the tossed provisional ballots and the unacceptably
long lines that led to so many disenfranchised voters in 2004? If so, we had
better remember, because recent analysis shows the states have not done enough
to make sure such problems don’t rear their ugly heads again during the
2006 and 2008 elections.
In 2000 and 2004, snafus in the voter registration process led to millions
of voters being unable to cast ballots. In America, obstacles exist even for
citizens trying to register to vote that are a continual factor in low voter
turn-out rates. First, unlike most other countries, the onus is on the
citizen, rather than the government, to figure how and where to register. Many
in poorer and less-educated communities will not get the information they need
to register and register properly. Election administrators may make mistakes
in the collection and input of a voter’s information, leading to the rejection
of that voter’s registration application or the failure of that voter’s
name to appear on the right poll book in the right polling location. With many
states having registration deadlines up to 30 days out from the Election
Day, many would-be voters will register too late, especially in our society
where people move frequently and must re-register every time they do so.
Some states are making it even harder to register, not easier, according to
a recently
published study of 10 key states conducted by The Century Foundation,
Common Cause and the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights. Most notable is
Arizona, where one now has to provide documentary proof of citizenship in order
to register. This has already led to thousands of voter registration forms being
rejected throughout the state; election administrators readily admit that most
of those rejected were citizens who, while perfectly eligible to vote, were
simply unable to produce a birth certificate. New restrictions on third party
voter registration drives—virtually the only groups that proactively work
to register Americans in minority and poor neighborhoods—also threaten
to reduce voter participation.
Read
the Entire Article
A bipartisan group of former secretaries of state and elections experts held
a conference call yesterday to brief reporters on what voters can expect at
the polls this November. Many new voting laws will have a profound impact on
what voters experience when they go to the voting booth for this year's midterm
elections. Participants on today's call included, Secretary Miles Rapoport,
former Secretary of State, (D-Conn.); Rev. DeForest Soaries, former Secy. of
State, (R-N.J.) and former chair, U.S. Election Assistance Commission; Ray Martinez,
fellow, policy advisor for Pew Center on the States, former vice chair, U.S.
Election Assistance Commission; and Tova Wang, democracy fellow at the Century
Foundation, staff person on Carter-Ford Commission.
Our democracy works best when more eligible voters participate in elections.
After a series of flawed elections, we need to make elections run more smoothly
and ensure that eligible voters are encouraged to vote and can vote. With three
weeks to go before the November elections, the following new voting rules and
procedures could have a profound impact on what voters experience when they
go to voting booths for this year's midterm elections. As a nation, we must
work harder to develop a voting system that encourages more eligible voters
to participate and correct problems that discourage voters. Read
the Entire Article
New machines, procedures and close races could add up to a difficult
Election Day
Download
electionline's report "Election Preview 2006: What’s Changed, What
Hasn’t and Why”
With the mid-term election two weeks away, a comprehensive report on the state
of election administration around the country finds cause for concern in a number
of states.
An estimated third of all voters will cast ballots on voting systems never
before used in a general election, while new procedures and legal battles over
voter identification could confuse voters, poll workers or both. Unfinished
and just-completed statewide voter registration databases, required as of Jan.
1, 2006 by the Help America Vote Act, have led to some confusion in parts of
the country as state agencies combine records and local election officials cede
control of their long-held registration rosters.
"The ingredients are there for problems in some parts of the country,”
said Doug Chapin, director of electionline,org, the nation’s leading nonpartisan
and non-advocacy source for election reform analysis and information. “Any
time you have new procedures, new voting systems that many poll workers and
voters might not be familiar with and combine that with an election that could
decide the fate of one or both branches of Congress, the potential is there
for a messy November 7. The steps that have been taken to improve and modernize
elections as part of HAVA could make things worse this year before it makes
voting better in the future."
"Election Preview 2006: What’s Changed, What Hasn’t and Why”,
issued today by electionline.org, provides an overview of the state of the American
electoral system with 14 days remaining before the mid-term vote. R%ead the Entire Press Release
From Around the States
The Supreme Court of the United states ruled unanimously yesterday that
Arizona may enforce Proposition 200, which requires voters to show a photo identification
card at the polls on Election Day this year, despite a pending lawsuit by opponents
who say the measure will disenfranchise the poor, minorities and the elderly.
Download
the Supreme Court Opinion
See
also Analysis at Moritzlaw.com
This article appeared on Bob
Bauer's Blog. It is reposted here with permission of the author.
It might have been thought—devoutly hoped—that the Supreme Court
would measure its steps carefully without striding once again in the territory
of Bush v. Gore. But this was not to be: this urge to intervene in the
electoral controversies of the day seems ingrained in its very constitution
(in a manner of speaking).
Yesterday’s decision in Purcell v. Gonzalez shows that the Court
can be severely faulted on one of two grounds: 1) it is careless with the very
appearance of its interventions, rendering decisions of political moment while
lost in the weeds of intra-court politics; or 2) it knows precisely what it
is doing. In any event, in the middle of the struggle over enfranchisement
mislabeled as a debate over fraud, the Court chose sides, advancing the prospects
of one side of the conflict. It did so with an insouciance that was fairly
astonishing, assuring readers that it was withholding judgment on the merits
and merely tending to proper order.
Of course, the Justices had their reasons. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
had enjoined the Arizona voter ID in flat but unexplained disagreement with
a District Court. But the District had yet, as the Supreme Court concedes, to
make findings of fact. The schedule for ultimate disposition might have been
somewhat messy, but election law litigation does not travel the most orderly
of paths, and the Ninth Circuit Order froze in place, putting off final adjudication
to another day, restrictions on the franchise. Read
the Entire Article
DC Statehood Green candidate, in routine review of votes after primary,
uncovers discrepancy: only 89 votes recorded for 140 Statehood Green voters,
with 51 votes apparently 'lost' - Reliability of certified results in Statehood
Green primary for Ward 5 seat on City Council in question -
40% of Republican votes apparently lost from the Ward 5 vote count; Statehood
Greens urge investigation by D.C. Board of Elections and Ethics
An investigation of voter rolls and votes in the September 12 primary election
in Washington, D.C.'s Ward 5 has revealed unexplained irregularities in the
race for the DC Statehood Green Party's nomination for the Ward 5 seat on City
Council.
Philip Blair examined the primary results after he apparently lost the primary
race to Carolyn Steptoe in a close 40-33 vote.
"In an effort to see if I had grounds for a challenge, I began the process
of checking the pollbooks to see who actually signed in as a Statehood Green
voter on election day," wrote Mr. Blair in an October 13, 2006 letter to
the D.C. Board of Elections and Ethics (BOEE). Links to Philip Blair's letters
to the BOEE are appended below.
Mr. Blair discovered a significant discrepancy between the number of Statehood
Green voters who signed in at the polls or submitted absentee ballots and the
number of Statehood Green votes that were reported in the primary election results
in many Ward 5 precincts.
"89 votes were recorded for 140 voters. 51 votes, many more than either
candidate received, simply disappeared from the final count announced in the
certified results," said Mr. Blair in his letter. Read
the Entire Article
Voters' Key Personal Information Available on the Internet
A serious security vulnerability was discovered in the City of Chicago online
voter registration database that would allow an identity pirate to obtain the
names, addresses, birth dates and Social Security numbers of more than 1.5 million
Chicago voters.
According to Bob Wilson, Cook County chair of Illinois Ballot Integrity Project,
a malicious hacker could have readily change the voter registration status of
individual voters or groups of voters. "For example, you could change the
status of all the voters in a precinct to inactive after the registration deadline
so that when one of those voters checked their online status they might believe
they were ineligible and wouldn't attempt to vote," said Wilson. "Or,
you could change their polling place information so they would show up at the
wrong precinct on election day…the possibilities are nearly endless and
could cause election day havoc," he added.
IBIP notified staff at the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners several
weeks ago about the vulnerability but no action was taken. "We had hoped
that the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners would take quick action to
plug this hole, but apparently that's not the case," said Illinois Ballot
Integrity Project member, Peter Zelchenko. He estimates it would take little
more than five minutes to fix the problem. Late last week, IBIP and Zelchenko
became aware that the security breach was significantly more severe than first
thought. The Board was immediately notified and began taking action to alleviate
the threat last Friday and began installing a new web interface over the weeekend.
Read
the Entire Article
This article was posted on Avi
Rubin's Blog. It is reposted here with permission of the author.
This week, three disks containing Diebold source code, that appear to have
come from Wyle Labs and Ciber Inc, the independent testing authorities that
certify voting machines for federal qualificaiton, were delivered anonymously
to a former Maryland state delegate. The story was covered this morning in the
Washington
Post and the Baltimore
Sun. I was asked by a reporter to inspect the disks to verify their contents,
and I enlisted Adam Stubblefield and my Ph.D. student Sam Small, and together
we examined them.
The disks contained source code for the BallotStation software, which is the
software on the voting machine, and what was labeled as GEMS, which is the back
end tabulation system. The GEMS disks were password protected, and while I'm
certain we could have cracked them, we chose not to. The BallotStation source
code was not protected at all. It was the 2004 version, which is newer than
the source code we analyzed in 2003,
and appears to be slightly later than the version analyzed
by the Princeton team. I would love the opportunity to perform a similar
analysis on this code, but yesterday, we were only given the opportunity to
inspect to the code to determine whether it was genuine. As a condition to inspecting
the disks, we agreed not to make copies or to perform any other activity with
the software. An analysis of this source code would answer many questions that
I've been asked about whether Diebold fixed the problems we encountered in our
previous analysis. Of course, I don't believe that all of the problems we found
back then are even fixable, but some of them are.
I've been getting calls all day asking exactly what the significance is of the
new software leak. I'm not really sure. If the software leaked out of Diebold,
then they obviously have not learned any lessons about securing their proprietary
information. If, as I suspect (due to the labels on the disks), the software
leaked out of the testing labs, then that is a serious problem that has to be
addressed. Don't get me wrong - I think that voting system software should be
available to the public, but that is a different issue from whether or not testing
labs are competent at protecting things that they are trusted with and that
they believe they are supposed to protect.
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Election Integrity News Editor: Warren
Stewart
VoteTrustUSA
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